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HOME MORTGAGE LENDERS AND EARTHQUAKE HAZARDS 
Risa Palm 
Department of Geography Universe of Colorado, Boulder. Colorado 80309 
 
ABSTRACT: A survey of major home mortgage lenders and real -property 
appraisers in California and the Puget Sound region shows a general inattention to 
earthquake hazards in appraisal and lending policy. This inattention is 
demonstrated not only in responses to survey questions, but also in a lack of 
differentiation in lending decisions between properties within and outside surface-
fault rupture zones. As posited by organizational theory however, important 
variants exist in this overall policy, almost always resulting from the efforts of 
individuals within large lending organizations. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, few homeowners are insured for earthquake-related damage. As a result, 
homeowners in earthquake-prone areas are particularly susceptible to serious financial losses. In 
California, for example, less than 10 percent of the homeowners are insured for earthquake-
related damage (Kunreuther et al. 1978; Palm 1981a; Steinbrugge 1982; Turner et al. 1979). 
Most of the homeowners' equity in such property, which is frequently the major source of 
savings for the individual household, could thus be lost in a single major event. 
 
Contrary to popularly held views, all of California is not equally susceptible to seismic-related 
damage. Even within individual metropolitan areas, it has been possible to develop 
microzonation maps to show regions likely to experience "no significant damage" in contrast to 
those likely to experience “extremely strong shock with partial or total destruction of some 
buildings” or “high ground water with high potential for ground failure (liquifaction)” (Figure 1). 
Such information could be made available to prospective home buyers in some systematic 
fashion or could be contained “in the market,” in the sense that housing in more hazardous would 
carry a lower price. Neither of these conditions, however, obtain at present. Although the 
Alquist-Priolo legislation in California requires real estate agents to inform home buyers if a 
property is within a surface-fault rupture zone (a “special studies zone”), this disclosure has been 
shown to be ineffective as a means of transmitting environmental information (Palm 1981a). 
Furthermore, house prices do not reflect location in such zones (Palm 198lb). Finally, the special 
studies zones themselves never were intended to approximate the area particularly liable to 
earthquake damage; because they are based solely on distance from a surface-fault trace and do 
not take into account bedrock conditions, areas susceptible to liquifaction and ground failure are 
excluded.· 
 
 FIGURE 1. Microzonation of Earthquake Hazards 
 
The purchase of housing takes place in a highly credit-dependent environment: most housing 
involves some form of mortgage financing, and, as a result, the willingness of the mortgage 
lender to grant a loan on favorable terms has a major influence on the purchase decision. What 
this means is that the lender has a major impact on the maximum price that can be obtained on a 
property. Although the actual final price is the product of “the market,” in which a buyer and 
seller reach an agreement, some consensus among appraisers and lenders about the market value 
of a class of housing affects the price range within which final negotiations take place. Thus, the 
ways in which home mortgage lenders estimate property value and make loan approvals set 
major limitations to individual locational decision making by prospective home buyers. 
The purpose of the research reported here was to study the responses of home mortgage lenders 
and real property appraisers to earthquake hazards. The study was designed to describe the 
practices of lenders and appraisers in incorporating earthquake hazards in their portfolio analysis 
and lending behavior. Its other purpose was to explore the applicability of recent organizational 
theory to an empirical setting in which individuals in very large organizations must respond to a 
highly complex and ambiguous environmental situation. 
 
2. DECISION MAKING BY LENDERS AND APPRAISERS 
The valuation of property by real-estate appraisers and the decision to grant or deny a loan 
application by home mortgage lenders are conceptualized as highly rational processes. 
Investment in a particular set of locations can be seen as comparable to the so-called “locational 
rationalization” process used to describe the behavior of multilocational or multinational 
corporations (Clarke 1 982; Taylor and Thrift 1981). In this system of analysis, operations are 
continuously checked against one another for relative profitability, and capital is moved rapidly 
to the most profitable locations (Clarke 1982; Taylor and Thrift 1981). The financial and 
operational performance of firms can be monitored, and performance is compared to normative 
indices (McConnell 1982). 
 
While the relatively longer-term investment in home mortgage loans is not perfectly captured by 
the locational rationalization system, lending and valuation decisions can be understood as part 
of an overall investment strategy. Further- more, valuation procedures and loan decision-making 
skills are frequently taught in university courses and described in textbooks (Bloom and Harrison 
1978). These idealized decision models can be used as a standard against which the actual 
behavior of appraisers and lenders can be measured. 
 
Models of Appraiser Behavior 
Real-estate appraisers are taught to use three methods to assess the value of single-family 
residences: the market-data or comparable approach, the cost method, and the income approach. 
The market-data approach, in which the subject property is compared to “comparable” property 
that has recently been sold, is used most commonly for single-family residential property. The 
appraisal report for this approach should include information on the house itself; its local 
environment, and neighborhood characteristics. In courses in real-estate appraisal, students are 
reminded that various hazards may affect the value of the property. 
Sometimes hazards exist in the neighborhood that reduce the value of a property. 
The most common hazard is heavy traffic, and the market will definitely recognize 
and penalize this problem. The awareness of flood hazards has become quite 
important in many parts of the country . . . [and the effect of flooding and mandatory 
flood insurance] on value must also be considered and reported in the appraisal. 
Other hazards that should be investigated include potential slides, earthquakes, 
dangerous ravines and bodies of water, or any unusual fire danger 
(Bloom and Harrison 1978, pp. 124-25). 
There are two significant points in this quotation; first, the notion that it is not the appraiser who 
is taking an active role in valuation, but rather, “the market,” which in this text is reified to 
enable it to “recognize” and “penalize” a problem; and second, the admonishment to take 
flooding and other natural hazards into account in the appraisal. 
 
Although appraisers may include descriptions of any number of variables in their reports, the 
final estimated value they report is based on probable market activity-the agreement reached 
between a seller and a buyer. In some ways, then, the appraiser simply reflects the workings of 
the market in attempting to estimate the probable selling price. In other ways, however, the 
appraiser influences the market, insofar as appraisal reports are used to make decisions 
concerning the amount of mortgage financing to be made available. The influence of appraisers 
is conservative: the appraisal report reflects past market behavior that, in the process of being 
reported and estimated for the current transaction, influences present financing decisions as well 
as perceptions of current market value. 
 
Home Mortgage Lending Practices 
Ideally, lending decisions are made in two steps. The first is a general portfolio analysis, 
including a decision about what percentage of assets to invest in housing. This decision is made 
in response to regulatory and tax constraints, liquidity needs, and the computation of the current 
ratio of profit-to-risk in residential loans. The second decision is made by loan officers or loan 
committees concerning particular applications for financing. Two factors are considered: 
characteristics of the borrower (the likelihood that the borrower will repay the loan in a timely 
fashion), and characteristics of the security property (the likelihood that in the event of a 
foreclosure, the costs of foreclosure and the balance of the loan outstanding will be covered). 
Studies have also shown that lending decisions are affected by the risk-taking inclinations of the 
loan officer, the perceived career advantage of particular risk-taking strategies (Schweig 1977), 
the dynamics of the decision-making process in the loan committee (Chalos 1982), and the 
previous relationship between the borrower and the loan officer. 
 
The rational decision-making model posits that lenders formulate an expected profit function 
which is used to evaluate any given loan application. For example, Shear and Yezer (1983) 
conceptualized a rational decision-making model: 
E(π) = Λ(1 + r)L + (1 – Λ) ΟV – (1 + i) L 
Where 
E(π) = expected profit 
Λ = expected probability of borrower not defaulting 
R = mortgage interest rate 
L = mortgage amount 
Ο = share of house value not captured by collection costs when default occurs 
V = expected value of house conditional on foreclosure occurring 
I = opportunity cost of capital 
Expected profit from a mortgage loan is equal to revenue from the loan (based on interest rate 
and resale value in the event of a default) minus the cost of making the loan (what the capital 
could return to the investor if placed in alternative investments). The mortgage's interest rate 
should be higher if the loan officer's perception of the possibility of default is higher, if 
opportunity costs are higher, or if collection costs when a default occurs are higher. The lender 
integrates earthquake hazards through a calculation of the probability that an earthquake will 
occur which will cause the loan to go into default, or that earthquake damage will impair the 
ability of the lender to recoup the investment in the event of a default. On this point, empirical 
evidence (Anderson and Weinrode 1981) suggests that moderate-intensity earthquakes have 
induced fairly high foreclosure and delinquency rates. 
 
This study posited that if lenders feared major potential financial losses associated with 
foreclosure proceedings or, in a period of weak or declining house values, anticipated negative 
net equities in the event of a major earthquake, then they might take measures to ensure the 
safety of their mortgage investments. It should be noted that even if only a few lenders refuse to 
grant conventional loans, require higher down payments, or require the purchase of earthquake 
insurance in areas particularly susceptible to seismic-related damage, the result would be some 
reduction in the flow of mortgage funds and a relatively higher cost of obtaining mortgage 
financing, thereby depressing property values. 
 
3. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
In the preceding discussion, a model of decision making and valuation by appraisers and lenders 
was presented which was based largely on “rational” calculations. Little consideration was given 
to the fact that organizations, including major lending institutions, are complex, inconsistent, and 
constantly changing. Decision theory that ignores such circumstances is clearly insufficient to 
capture the complexity involved in the actual valuation of hazards and the integration of this 
valuation in lending behavior. It is important, therefore, to review those aspects of organization 
theory that contribute to the understanding of' the response of lending institutions to uncertainty 
in the physical environment. 
 
Recent work in organizational theory has diverged from the classic models describing 
communication and decision making within large organizations (Putnam 1982). Putnam and 
Cheney (1985) have concluded that recent studies of organizational communication have 
emphasized the ways in which meaning is created. Organizations are seen increasingly as simple 
aggregates of persons arranged in patterned relationships, rather than as formal and permanent 
structures. In addition, more attention has been paid to intraorganizational conflict in studies 
focusing on resource control or power, and the influence of “gatekeepers” on decision making 
(DuBrin 1972; Kanter 1977). 
 
Thompson (1983) has argued that the objectives of firms are often ambiguous and contradictory. 
In the firm, there are conflicting interests, continuing negotiations, and alliances continuously 
being renegotiated, reformed, and dissolved. The organizational management “charts an always 
compromised course through an always changing series of constraints and obstacles where an 
always shifting series of partial objectives are in play in that negotiation” (Thompson 1983, p. 
237). Similar arguments have been made by Salaman (1978) and Heydebrand (1977). 
 
Another perspective has been provided by communication theorists influenced by an 
anthropological approach to organizations (Pacanowsky and O'Donnel-Trujillo 1982). This line 
of argument promotes attention to “organizational culture.” Within this framework, studies 
would focus on the use of “relevant constructs” (shared vocabulary which indicates the ways in 
which individuals affiliated with the organization structure their experiences), “facts” (shared 
social knowledge within the organization), “practices” (methods of performing particular 
functions), “metaphors'' (specific phrases or symbols used to structure the reality of the 
organization), “stories” (narratives about real and ideal organizational life), and “rites and 
rituals” to orient and share reality with other organizational members. 
 
Recent sociological approaches have stressed a historical perspective. Bensen (1977) has argued 
for increased attention to the historical process from which present-day organizational patterns 
have been generated and through which relationships are sustained. Similarly, Giddens (1979, 
1984) and Abrams (1982) have called for an increased emphasis on the evolution of the 
organization within broader societal structures; the organization continually emerges as a 
function the influence of individuals as well as structure. 
 
Regional science has also concerned itself with these theoretical perspectives. Two presidential 
addresses to the Regional Science Association, by Torsten Hägerstrand (1970) and Allan Pred 
(1985), have pointed up the importance of the investigation of human agency embedded in a 
complex organizational structure. In Pred's paper, explicit attention was given to the importance 
of studying the ways in which situated individuals affect the development of structure -- how 
human agency produces and maintains places and regions. 
 
A continuing theme in this literature the necessity to focus on diversity within organizational 
structures, as well as on the specific historic circumstances which have contributed to current 
organizational structure and practice. When studying the response of financial institutions to the 
physical environment, diversity of responses within a single industry should he monitored. This 
would elicit an understanding of conflicts within individual institutions, of their resolution in 
particular cases, and of the influence on overall organizational policy of individuals with varying 
professional goals and personal experiences. External constraints to organizational response 
should also he included explicitly in the analysis. 
 
Both the rational decision-making models and the frameworks suggested by recent work in 
organizational theory were used to formulate hypotheses for the study reported here. It was 
hypothesized that the aggregate of lending and appraisal decisions generally follow principles of 
rational decision making: that, except where forced to respond to low probability events by other 
legislation, lenders rarely consider the unlikely event of major destruction associated with 
earthquake in their overall lending decisions, and that little disinvestment occurs in earthquake-
hazard areas. It was also proposed, however, that (1) there are intra-industry variations in this 
generalization (significant differences in the ways in which earthquake hazards information is 
incorporated and weighted in lending policy); and (2) certain individuals within financial 
institutions have had significant impact on the decision to adopt a particular lending policy with 
respect to earthquake hazards. 
 
4. THE SURVEY OF APPRAISERS 
In order to ascertain the practices and attitudes of real estate appraisers to earthquake hazards, a 
survey of 30 California appraisers was conducted between November 1982 and February 1983. 
Individuals interviewed were, in all but one case, independent fee-appraisers who were self-
employed or employed by appraisal firm, rather than by a financial institution. All had been 
appraisers for more than 10 years, and most of them did single-family house appraisal primarily 
for mortgage lenders. 
 
Appraisers were asked how they incorporated information into their property appraisals about a 
variety of environmental factors, including, landslide hazards, location in a flood plain, location 
on a surface-fault trace, location in a special studies zone, and evidence of damage to the 
property from earthquakes or landslides. They were asked if they routinely investigated these 
factors, if they noted them in their appraisal reports, if they checked comparable properties for 
these factors, and if they identified a price adjustment for each factor (Table 1). Although 
appraisers said they almost always investigated whether a property was in a flood plain, only a 
minority sought information on whether it was on a surface-fault trace, and only 13 percent made 
any price adjustment for this factor. It was exceptional that comparables were checked for 
similar hazard conditions, or that any price adjustment was made. 
 
TABLE 1. Appraisals and Environmental Hazards 
 Percentage of appraisers who: 
 Investigate 
if 
condition 
applies 
Note in 
report 
Check 
comparables 
Identify 
price 
adjustment 
Floodplain 93 87 77 23 
Special Studies 
Zone 
67 53 57 17 
On surface-fault 
trace 
37 37 23 13 
Landslide area 57 43 43 33 
Evidence of 
previous damage 
63 63 27 17 
 
To elicit another view of the way in which appraisers incorporate earthquake hazards into a 
property valuation, they were provided with an example of a typical property and asked to make 
an appropriate price adjustment. They were asked to estimate the 1982 price of a “fifteen-year 
old, tract or semi-custom house with 1,800 square feet, three bedrooms, and two bathrooms, on a 
standard-sized lot in an average middle-income and middle-aged neighborhood in this 
community.” The median price estimated by the California appraisers for such a house was 
$160,000, with the estimated price ranging from $115,000 to $250,000. When asked, “In your 
experience, what range of price reduction have you encountered if the property were in a special 
studies zone or surface-fault rupture zone,” most responded that there was no price reduction at 
all; the median response was 0.1 percent reduction (Table 2). Most appraisers felt that location in 
a landslide-prone area, or evidence of actual damage from previous earthquake-related 
movement, would have a negative effect on price, but that the location of a property within a 
mapped floodp1ain or special studies zone would not, by itself, lower the price. This perception 
is in accord with previous statistical analysis of actual price effects (Palm 1981b). 
 
TABLE 2. Valuation of an “Average House” 
The house . . . 
Median 
estimated 
price 
reduction 
Percentage 
of 
appraisers 
who said 
“no 
reduction” 
. . . is in a mapped floodplain 0.3% 69.6 
. . . is in a landslide-prone area 17.0% 25.0 
. . . is in a Special Studies Zone 0.1% 75.0 
. . . shows evidence of actual 
damage from previous earth 
movement 
10.0% 40.0 
 
Appraisers were asked whether they had ever had a client request information concerning 
seismic hazard. Only three of the respondents (10 percent of the sample) said they were 
frequently asked about seismic hazards by clients; the others answered that they were rarely or 
never asked. Appraisers whose clients asked for seismic information were also more likely to say 
that they routinely investigate whether a property is located on a surface-fault trace or landslide- 
prone area, to note this in the appraisal report, and to check comparables for both characteristics. 
 
In general, appraisers behaved as hypothesized. They indicated that earthquakes cannot be 
isolated as an influence on value because they occur only infrequently. In addition, the effect on 
price is generally small and short-lived. 
 
Appraisers do not feel that earthquake hazards have been incorporated “by the market” into 
housing prices and, therefore, generally disregard their potential effect on value. Although there 
is individual variability in appraisal practice, most appraisers respond to what they perceive as 
the realities of the market. 
 
THE RESPONSE OF LENDERS TO EARTHQUAKE HAZARDS 
A survey of chief executive officers (or their designates) was conducted in last three months of 
1982 among 90 California lending institutions, and 30 similar institutions in the Puget Sound 
Region. The combined assets in home mortgage loans for the Washington sample accounted for 
approximately 60 percent of all home mortgages held by commercial banks, savings banks, and 
savings and loans in the state; the California sample represented about 75 percent of such assets. 
 
An open -ended question asked lenders to list those characteristics of a property that are 
important in their decision to grant a home mortgage loan. Only 37 percent of the responses 
included some sort of geophysical hazard, such location in a floodplain, location with respect to 
a known earthquake fault, or susceptibility to landslides. When asked more directly whether 
seismic risk was considered when evaluating loans on residential property, the vast majority 
respondents in both states said that seismic conditions were not considered as a basis for setting 
loan conditions. Overall, only 18 lenders, mostly in California, did consider seismic conditions. 
 
The rational lending model suggests that earthquake hazards should be a factor in the lending 
decision if lenders believe that large numbers of households would default after a major 
damaging earthquake, and if areas particularly susceptible to earthquake damage can be 
pinpointed. , Several questions were posed to probe lenders' perceptions of these issues. 
 
First, lenders were asked to rank five possible causes of mortgage default-- unemployment 
of the head of household, divorce, fire, major flooding, and major earthquake damage. In 
both California and Washington, lenders evaluated a major earthquake as the least likely 
cause of mortgage default. 
A second perspective was sought with a question designed to elicit the beliefs of lenders 
concerning the likely outcomes of a major damaging earthquake. The question provided a 
scenario of probable damage following the maximum intensity earthquake likely to occur in the 
three areas. Three forms of this question were posed: one for the Puget Sound (based on U.S. 
Geological Survey 1975), a second for Northern California (based on Davis et al. 1982a), and a 
third for Southern California (based on Davis et al. 1982b). In Southern California, scenario 
read: 
An earthquake along the southern San Andreas Fault has a high 1ikelihood of 
occurrence. An 8.3 event would claim $17 billion in property damage, between 
3,000 and 14,000 dead, and between 12,000 and l5, 000 hospitalized, depending 
upon the time of day the event occurs. 
Lenders in the three regions were then asked to speculate on the likely outcomes such an 
earthquake (Table 3). Lenders do expect mortgage defaulting in the event of a major earthquake 
and believe that some insurers will be unable to meet their liabilities. When asked what 
proportion of their portfolios they expected would he in default, most Washington lenders 
indicated only a small percentage (less than 10 percent), but California lenders were more 
pessimistic. Almost one-fourth of the California lenders expect more than 25 percent of their 
home mortgage portfolios to be in default. 
 
TABLE 3. What Would Be the Likely Results of a Major Earthquake? 
 Percentage of lenders who said 
“yes” or “maybe” 
 California 
sample 
Washington 
sample 
Increased mortgage defaults 98 94 
Fire insurance more expensive 76 77 
Changes in the building code 75 87 
Local recession 71 57 
Insurers unable to meet liabilities 53 35 
Adequate government aid 41 43 
Earthquake insurance unavailable 40 21 
State-wide recession 35 30 
Fire insurance unavailable 16 10 
 
Market Impacts of Lender Perceptions 
The survey research indicates a lack of attention to earthquake hazards. To investigate the market 
impact of this attitude to earthquake hazards, loan applications in California were analyzed. 
Economic theory would posit that the market should reflect the response of even a minority of 
lenders (Brookshire and Schulze 1980, 1982; Rosen 1974): Although explicit incorporation of 
earthquake hazards is done by only a minority of lenders, their actions should result in a 
weakening of house prices within special studies zones. 
 
To test this hypothesis, data from the California Loan Register Report were analyzed. This 
publication contains detailed information on home loan .applications from all California state-
licensed savings and loans over the period of 1976 to 1981. The second and third quarters of 
1979 and 1980 were selected to draw a sample. This period contained a large number of property 
transfers and immediately preceded a very rapid rise in interest rates which weakened the 
market. 
 
The specific hypothesis was that the decision to grant a loan would be systematically related to 
the ratio of sales price to income, the age of housing, whether the property was owner- or renter-
occupied, the race or ethnicity of the borrower and whether or not the census tract in which the 
house was located was included in a special studies zone. Variables reflecting the borrower's 
credit history, the more detailed attributes of each property and information on the immediately 
surrounding neighborhoods also should be included. Such information is not available in the 
Loan Register Report; the model, therefore, uses age of housing and proposed tenure status of 
the borrower as general indicators of neighborhood quality, and race or ethnicity of the borrower 
to control for possible discrimination factors. Weak evidence of discrimination was found by 
Schafer and Ladd (1981) and Goebel (1982) in their analyses of the same data set. 
 
Data analysis was conducted for the state as a whole, as well as for smaller housing submarkets. 
The statewide calculations were performed to get a very general outline of the characteristics of 
lending decisions. Submarket approximations give a more detailed and accurate picture of the 
contributions of individual variables to the lending decisions, since it can be argued that various 
submarkets operate independently (Straszheim 1974). Ideally, submarket areas should be defined 
by patterns of information exchange, an area which is best approximated by Board of Realtors 
territories (Bourne 1976; Palm 1976, 1978); counties within SMSAs were used to approximate 
Board of Realtors Districts. 
 
For the state as a whole, and for ten counties within the major SMSAs, determinant functions 
were calculated, as well as t-tests on the individual variables to determine their relationship to the 
lending decision (Table 4). Location in a special studies zone entered only the discriminant 
functions for Riverside, San Bernardino, and Santa Clara Counties. T-tests on this variable 
showed that there was a significant difference between loan applications granted and denied in 
special studies zones versus other areas only in Alameda and Riverside Counties. Both of these 
cases are interesting because the relationship was exactly the opposite of what would have been 
expected: loans on property located in the special studies zones (surface-fault rupture zones) 
were more likely to be granted than loans on property located in other areas. The explanation is 
not a perverse preference of residents of these counties for earthquake hazards zones; rather, it is 
probable that special studies zones do not contribute in any way to the lending decisions, and 
other amenities associated with these zones make them attractive to lenders. In Alameda County 
the special studies zones are associated with architecturally unique properties in the hills of 
Oakland and Berkeley along the Hayward Fault. In Riverside County, the special studies zone 
runs through a set of rapidly developing desert communities, including Morongo Valley, Desert 
Hot Springs and North Palm Springs. In both cases the special studies zone is in a portion of the 
county which is desirable for relatively newer, higher-priced housing, and the zone designation 
has not had a negative impact on loan applications. 
 
In the state taken as a whole, and in the urban submarkets approximated by counties within 
major SMSAs, only two variables were consistently related to the decision to accept or reject a 
home mortgage loan application. First, lenders tended to act more favorably on loan application 
for new housing rather than older housing (except in San Francisco County). Second, ethnicity 
and race of the borrower had an impact on the lending decision in several of the counties: 
Hispanic borrowers were less likely to rece1ve a favorable loan decision in Alameda, Los 
Angeles, Riverside, and Santa Clara Counties than were Anglo borrower, and black borrowers 
were more likely to receive a negative decision in all but San Bernardino County. The ratio of 
sales price to income was related to the lending decisions only in Alameda, Los Angeles, San 
Bernardino, and San Francisco Counties, contrary to expectations based on the rational decision 
model. 
 
TABLE 4. Statistical Analysis of Home Loan Applications 
Sample SP/I AGE OWN BLACK HISP SSZ 
State 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 2  
Counties       
 Alameda  1.2  1.2 1.2  
 Contra Costa 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 2  
 Los Angeles 1.2 1.2 1 1.2 2  
 Orange 1.2 1  1.2 1.2  
 Riverside 1.2 2   2 1.2 
 San Bernardino 1.2 2 1.2   2 
 San Francisco 1.2 1.2  1.2 2  
 San Mateo 1.2 2  1.2   
 Santa Clara 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 2 
 Ventura  2 2 1.2   
 
Symbols 
1 = t - value for difference between loans granted and loans refused significant at .05 for this variable 
2 = variable entered into the discriminant function 
 
Variable Definitions 
SP/I Ratio of sales price to family income 
AGE Year the house was build 
OWN Owner-occupied housing 
BLACK Borrower was black 
HISP Borrower was Hispanic 
SSZ Property was located in a Special Studies Zone 
 
In sum, location in a special studies zone does not seem to have a negative impact on the lending 
decision: instead, it has no impact whatsoever. T is finding is not surprising given both the size 
and diversity of the special studies zones, and the survey responses of lenders and appraisers. 
Both survey data and information on correlates of lending decision provide evidence that 
location in a surface-fault rupture zone does not affect the evaluation of that property by 
appraisers and lenders. The mere mapping of special studies zones has not resulted in a change 
of lender behavior, nor a tendency to avoid investment the zones. 
 
6. CHARACTERISTICS OF LENDERS WHO DO CONSIDER SEISMIC RISK 
Although the general hypothesis of this research project was that lenders would tend to ignore 
the low probability, locationally unspecific earthquake hazard, the subhypothesis was that there 
would be intra-industry variation in this response. This variation would be attribuable.to the 
organizational structure of lending institutions and the impacts of key individuals within these 
institutions. To gain further insights on the behavior of the minority of lenders who do consider 
seismic risk in their lending policies, the responses of California lenders to questions about the 
incorporation of seismic risk in lending decisions were cross tabulated with other portions of the 
questionnaire. This tabulation revealed that California lenders who considered seismic risk in 
residential loans were also more likely to consider seismic risk when evaluating loans on 
commercial property; were more likely to require earthquake insurance when there was evidence 
of previous seismic or geologic damage; were more likely to favor lender-required earthquake 
insurance as an industry-wide policy; were more favorable to instituting earthquake insurance 
requirements if the cost of such insurance could be reduced; were more likely to require 
earthquake insurance for property located within a special studies zone; were more likely to 
refuse loans because of location within a special studies zone or a landslide-prone area or 
because of evidence of previous damage to the dwelling unit from seismic or geological activity; 
were more likely to state that it is the lender's responsibility to inform home buyers about 
earthquake hazards; and were more likely to use geologic or other scientific information in their 
lending decisions. They were also less likely than other lenders to expect government aid to be 
adequate to reimburse homeowners for their disaster losses following a major earthquake. 
 
Discriminant functions corroborated these simple cross tabulations. Coefficients were calculated 
from a stepwise procedure using Wilks’ lambda criterion (Rao 1973).The variables entering into 
the function are shown in the first column of Table 5. These variables correctly classify 83.9 
percent of the grouped lenders. 
 
The responses of California lenders who said they required earthquakes insurance for loans on 
property underlain by a surface-fault trace were similarly classified. Of 62 California lenders, 12 
indicated that they have such requirements. The variables shown on the right in Table 5 correctly 
classify 88.6 percent of lenders grouped in this way. 
 
To gain further insights into the history of the development of an earthquake-sensitive lending 
policy among the minority of institutions which explicitly considered seismic hazard, a second 
round of interviews was conducted in the early months of 1984 at institutions that (1) had a 
policy incorporating seismic risk in residential lending and (2) had a written document outlining 
this policy. Ten of the 90 institutions contacted in the first round of interviews were included, 
representing about 18 percent of the total California residential loan portfolio held by the 
combination of all commercial banks and savings and loan institutions as of 1981. 
 
The sequence of events that permitted a change in lending policy varied among the institutions. 
Some responded to losses from previous earthquake; such as the 1971 Sylmar/San Francisco 
earthquake; others said that the Community Reinvestment Act or the Federal Flood Insurance 
Program encouraged lenders to reevaluate their entire lending policy; and still others indicated 
educational seminars influenced them to consider such a policy. Although hazard mitigation 
policies resulted from various sequences of events, in all cases, one person had been responsible 
for instituting and promoting a lending policy sensitive to seismic risk. In most of the institutions 
this individual was a high ranking executive (the president, chief executive officer, or member of 
the board of directors), although in a few cases the individual was a residential loan officer.  
 
In sum, lenders generally behaved as hypothesized. Overall, lenders ignore low-probability 
earthquake hazard, despite a recognition of its potentially disastrous effect on the economic well-
being of the institution. In the minority of cases where lending policy has adjusted to the 
presence of earthquake hazards, it was the efforts of a single individual motivated by specific 
circumstances that effected the institution’s response. 
 
TABLE 5. Characteristics of Lenders Who Consider Earthquake Hazards 
Lenders Including Seismic Risk 
in Loan Policy 
 
Lenders Requiring Earthquake 
Insurance for Property on a 
Surface-Fault Trace 
Variable Entering 
Canonical 
Discriminant 
Function 
Standardized 
Coefficient* 
 
Variable Entering 
Canonical 
Discriminant 
Function 
Standardized 
Coefficient* 
Lender’s 
responsibility to 
inform buyers of 
hazards 
.55  
Percentage of loans 
that would be in 
default 
.64 
Commercial bank 
(vs. S and L) 
.55  
Consider seismic 
risk on personal 
residence 
.58 
Consider seismic 
hazard on personal 
residence 
.51  
Lender’s 
responsibility to 
inform buyers of 
hazards 
.53 
Have earthquake 
insurance on 
personal residence 
.40  
Rank earthquake as 
cause of default 
.51 
Have attended 
earthquake seminar 
.31  
Location in San 
Francisco 
.36 
Years as a loan 
officer 
−.29  
Volume vs. safety 
as criteria of 
success as lender 
−.36 
Percentage of 
loans that would 
be in default 
.21  
Have attended 
earthquake seminar 
.22 
*Wilks' Lambda for all coefficients significant beyond the .01 confidence 
level 
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has shown that, in the aggregate, home mortgage lenders and real-property appraisers 
respond only passively to earthquake hazards. Most lenders do not believe that a major damaging 
earthquake is a likely cause of large-scale defaulting. They cite several justifications for this 
belief. First, at present, earthquakes cannot be precisely predicted either in time or location. 
Second, they believe that even in the event of a major earthquake, their portfolios are relatively 
insulated from major losses -- large homeowner equity would insure the lenders of an eventual 
continuation of mortgage repayments. Third, they feel that other events, including unanticipated 
unemployment of principle wage earners, or dissolution of the family, are far more likely to 
impair repayment of mortgage loans. Lenders are, therefore, responding to a low-probability 
event in a way they see as rational: they accept the small risk of loss that might accompany a 
major damaging earthquake. Lenders depend on “the market” to help them with lending 
decisions, except when actually forced by legislation or regulation to heed low-probability 
natural hazards. 
 
A significant exception to this overall conclusion is the finding that nine major home mortgage 
lenders, with combined residential loan portfolios accounting for 18 percent of loans held by 
California savings and loans and commercial banks, do have written statements incorporating 
earthquake hazards into residential lending policies. In every case, these institutions adopted 
such evaluation procedures as the result of the influence of a particular individual. In some cases, 
this person had been influenced by state or federally supported earthquake education seminars, or 
by experience in dealing with the impairment of mortgage repayment associated with previous 
earthquakes. This finding should be noted by agencies that have sponsored earthquake education 
seminars for corporate officers, such as the California Seismic Safety Commission, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S. Geological Survey, since it indicates that their 
efforts have borne some fruit. Another important finding is that those lenders who explicitly 
consider earthquake hazards do not feel that such stipulations have, in any way, resulted in a 
decline of loan applications or lost business. On the contrary, lenders testified that they gained 
increased security in their own portfolios, as well as the thanks of loan applicants for informing 
them about the need to reduce the susceptibility of the household to equity losses. 
 
The study also demonstrates the ways in which structuring theory can provide a framework for 
better understanding the response to a complex, ever- changing environment. Theories of 
organizational communication point up the significance of individual influence in corporate 
policy, and the extent to which variability can exist within a single institution. Structuring theory 
calls attention to the combination of the influence of individuals (agents) and structural 
constraints in placing individuals and aggregates of individuals in a particular action context. In 
the case of lending institutions, the primary environmental constraint is not that of the 
geophysical setting, but rather the shorter-term set of economic conditions, state and federal 
banking regulations, and competitive strategies adopted by other similar institutions. Attention to 
these constraints permits a better understanding of the seeming non-response of lenders to 
serious environmental hazards. 
 
The synthesis of theoretical perspectives suggested in structuration theory (Giddens 1984) 
permits and promotes a more revealing analysis of a highly complex human-environmental 
situation. It is from such an approach that insights into the nature of the human-environmental 
system may be obtained, and strategies for intervention and mitigation may best be formulated. 
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